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Abstract—Secure circuits are prone to a wide range of physical
attacks. Among those are fault attacks based on modifying the
circuit environment in order to change its behaviour or to induce
faults into its computations. There are many common means
used to inject such faults: laser shots, electromagnetic pulses,
overclocking, chip underpowering, temperature increase, etc. In
this paper we study the effect of negative power supply glitches
on a FPGA. The obtained faults were compared to faults injected
by clock glitches. As a result, both power and clock glitch induced
faults were found to be identical. Because clock glitches are
related to timing constraint violations, we shall consider that
both power and clock glitches share this common fault injection
mechanism. We also further studied the properties of this fault
injection means.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical attacks (or hardware attacks) target the integrated
circuits (ICs) which implement cryptographic algorithms for
the purpose of providing security features. Amongst these
physical attacks, this work focuses on fault attacks (FA), which
consists in modifying the circuit environment in order to
change its behaviour or to induce faults into its computations.
There are many common means used to inject such faults:
laser shots, electromagnetic pulses, overclocking, chip under-
powering, temperature increase, etc.
There are three main subclasses of fault attacks: code re-
routing, safe error (not addressed in this paper) and differential
fault analysis. Code re-routing consists in replacing instruc-
tions executed by a micro-controller [2] to circumvent its
security features (for example a PIN of a smartcard could
be broken), or in weakening the strength of an iterative
encryption algorithm by changing the number of its rounds
[10]. Differential fault analysis (DFA) consists in retrieving
the keys by comparing correct and faulted ciphertexts (i.e.
ciphertexts obtained from a faulted encryption). This technique
was first introduced for public key encryption algorithms [7],
and rapidly extended to secret key algorithms [6]. From that
time, many DFA schemes have been proposed to attack various
encryption algorithms. Except for DES, most of them are
associated with strong timing, range and location requirements
regarding the fault injection process. If the faults are not
induced at the proper time in the algorithm, or affect the wrong
bits, the entire DFA process fails.
As a consequence, the ability to control precisely the fault
injection process is a key element in carrying out any fault
attack. A fine understanding of the various fault injection
mechanisms is also mandatory to enable the design of fault
resistant ICs. That’s the reason why this paper focuses on an
in-depth investigation of transient voltage supply deprivation
(the so-called power glitches). This fault injection mean is
known and used since the beginning of FA [3]. However,
there are few papers in the scientific bibliography ([17], [5],
[14]), which report a deep investigation and understanding of
the underlying fault injection mechanisms related to power
glitches. Our contributions to that research field are:
• the experimental proof that power glitches create timing
constraint violations (as clock glitches and underpowering
do),
• a study of the properties and physical limitations of this
injection means.
A programmable circuit (FPGA) was chosen as a test vehicle
to conduct this study. It implements the advanced encryption
standard (AES [15]), which is a secret key encryption algo-
rithm.
This article is organized as follows: a remainder on timing
constraints and an explanation of how faults may be injected
by their violation are given in section II. A state-of-the-art on
clock and power glitches induced faults is given in section
III. The experimental set-up and the experiments outline are
described in section IV. Then, the experimental results and
their analysis are reported in section V. Finally a conclusion
is drawn.
II. TIMING CONSTRAINTS
In this section, the basics of timing constraints are firstly re-
minded. Secondly, the two means of inducing timing constraint
violations for the purpose of fault injection are reviewed. Then,
the experimental proof intended to demonstrate the equiva-
lence of these two fault injection mechanisms is introduced.
A. Timing constraints
Almost all digital ICs use a common clock signal to synchro-
nize their internal operations. Figure 1 outlines a representation
of their internal architecture: combinatorial logic (marked
P
)
surrounded upstream and downstream by register banks made
of D flip-flops (DFF) sharing the same clock signal (clk).
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Fig. 1. Internal architecture of digital ICs
Data are released from the first register bank on a clock
rising edge and then processed through the logic before being
latched into the next register on the next clock rising edge.
Thus, in first approximation the clock period (Tclk) has to
be longer than the maximum data propagation time through
the logic (DpMax) to ensure correct operation. Besides, a
precise writing of the timing constraint equation requires to
take into account three other parameters: Dclk2q the delay
elapsed between the clock rising edge and the actual update of
a register’s output; Tskew the skew or slight phase difference
that may exist between the clock signals at the clock inputs
of two different registers; Tsetup the setup time which is the
amount of time for which a D flip-flop input must be stable
before the clock’s edge to ensure reliable operation. (It also
exists an hold time (Thold) which expresses the same constraint
but after the clock edge.) Hence, the timing constraint equation
(eq. 1) is obtained:
Tclk > Dclk2q +DpMax + Tsetup − Tskew (1)
An illustration, at bit level, of the signal flow is given
in figure 2-a for which the timing constraint is fulfilled.
Note that the input of the downstream DFF (Ddownstream)
undergoes many logic glitches related to the calculations of the
combinatorial logic before stabilizing. It exists a time margin
(called the slack) between the last signal transition at the input
of the downstream register and the setup time.
The violation of this timing constraint is a straightforward
means to inject faults into a circuit. Two stages of such
violations are depicted in fig. 2-b-c. A shaded area around the
clock rising edge delineates a time interval which corresponds
to a non-deterministic behaviour of the DFF in case of any
transition on its input. It extends before and after the clock
edge from an amount of time equal to the setup and hold
times respectively. A setup time violation arises if the last
signal transition is too close to the clock rising edge (Fig.2-
b). Then, the DFF’s output undergoes a metastable behaviour
[13]: it may stabilize either on a high or low state regardless of
its input’s value. An error may occur or not. Fig.2-c introduces
a second kind of faulty behaviour: an early latching. In this
instance, an erroneous logic value is latched by the register:
a fault is actually injected. The fault injection process is then
purely assured and deterministic because there is no signal
transition in the shaded area. Hereafter, we will refer to timing
constraint violations for both cases.
The two next subsections reports the means to achieve such
timing violations.
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Fig. 2. Timing constraint (a) fulfilled or violated: (b) setup violation, (c) early
latching.
B. Overcloking
A straightforward approach to inject faults through timing
constraint violations is overclocking. It consists in decreasing
the clock’s period until faults appear by setup time violation
or early latching (Eq. 2).
Tclkoverclocking < Dclk2q +DpMax + Tsetup − Tskew (2)
Overclocking does not provide any timing control: faults
may be induced at any clock cycle of the targeted IC. An
enhancement of that technique consists in inducing a timing
violation by modifying only one chosen clock period (see III).
C. Increasing propagation time
The second means of violating the timing constraint equa-
tion (cf. eq. 1) is by increasing its right handside part. It may
be achieved by increasing the data propagation time through
the logic (DpMax). As shown by equation 3:
Tclk < Dclk2q +DpMaxincreased + Tsetup − Tskew (3)
For the sake of simplicity, the data propagation time through
a simple CMOS inverter as a function of the power supply is
recalled.The physical equations are obviously more elaborated
for more complicated logic. However, the observable trends
are alike. The inverter’s architecture and waveforms are de-
picted in figure 3 where tpLH and tpHL are its propagation
delays for an output’s transition from low to high and high to
low logic levels respectively.
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Fig. 3. Inverter: architecture and typical waveforms
Note that tpLH and tpHL may have different values. Hence,
the data propagation time through the inverter (and through
any logic block) depends on the handled data: the propagation
time is data-dependent.
The propagation time, tpLH (eq. 4), is obtained from a first
order analysis [16] of the inverter’s dynamic behaviour:
tpLH =
CL

2|Vth,p|
VDD − |Vth,p|
+ ln
✓
3− 4
|Vth,p|
VDD
◆]
µpCox
Wp
Lp
(VDD − |Vth,p|)
(4)
where VDD is the power supply voltage, CL the load ca-
pacitance, Vth,p the PMOS threshold voltage, µp the holes
mobility, Cox the gate oxyde capacitance and (Wp/Lp) the
aspect ratio of the PMOS. A similar equation for tpHL may
be derived from eq. 4 by substituting the parameters related
to the inverter’s NMOS (e.g. µn, (Wn/Ln), Vth,n) for those
related to the PMOS.
Underpowering: as stated by eq. 4 any decrease of VDD
will induce an increase of the propagation delay of the inverter.
By extension, the data propagation time through any logic
block is increased as long as the IC is underpowered. Hence,
underpowering is a common means to achieve fault injection
by violation of the timing constraints.
D. Several fault injection means, a common mechanism
Therefore, overclocking and underpowering (and also over-
heating, however not studied in this paper for the sake of
brevity) are two suitable means to inject faults into a circuit
by violation of its timing constraints [5], [17]. Intuitively,
these two means are usually considered to originate in a
same mechanism. Underpowering is characterized by a static
behaviour (i.e. the chip’s supply voltage is set to a constant
value outside its nominal range), which make it relatively
easy to investigate and understand the corresponding injection
mechanism.
Whereas power supply glitches consist in a transient per-
turbation of the power supply voltage. The assumption that
power glitches induce faults by violation of the target’s timing
constraints is often made [18], [3]. However, no evidence of
that assumption is given in the scientific bibliography. Indeed,
the fact that power glitch induced faults are due to (and
only to) timing constraint violations is questionable because
it may involve some dynamic behaviour related to the fast
modification of the power supply. Hence, the novelty of our
approach lies in the proposal of an experimental validation
of this assumption. This proof is based on the analysis of
the injected faults by means of both clock and power supply
glitches on a test chip handling the same data (the latter con-
dition is due to the data-dependence of the propagation times,
and consequently of the induced faults). The equivalence of
the injected faults for these two means is the core of that proof
as reported in the next sections.
III. STATE-OF-THE-ART OF CLOCK AND POWER GLITCHES
A. Clock glitch induced faults
The use of clock glitches to induce faults into the compu-
tations of an IC is well known. It consists in decreasing one
clock period until a fault is injected due to timing constraint
violations. Recent papers have introduced dedicated platforms
on FPGAs [12], [1], [11]. This technique provides the ability to
choose precisely the stress applied to the target (i.e. the time
decrement of the targeted clock period), and thus the number
of the injected faults. It also, by nature, makes it possible to
select a given calculation cycle, which is a useful property to
meet the requirements of DFA’s schemes.
We have designed our own clock glitch fault injection
platform based on these previous researches. This design
allows us to set the modified clock period with an accuracy
of 35ps.
As reported in [1], [11], [14], clock glitch induced faults
are characterized by two main properties:
• faults are data-dependent (i.e. if the processed data
change so does the injected faults and the associated
critical times),
• the fault injection process may undergo a metastable
behaviour (as exemplified in fig. 2-b) when the stress
applied to the target is still low. As the stress increases
the injection process may become deterministic (see fig.
2-c as an illustration).
These two properties are related to any fault injection means
based on timing constraint violation.
B. Power glitch induced faults
Power supply glitches are often used to induce faults into
secure ICs. Its use (mainly on micro-controllers) has been
extensively reported [3], [8], [18], [4] for glitches consisting
in a sudden negative change of the power supply voltage.
However, very few papers have been dedicated to a deep
investigation of the underlying fault injection mechanism. The
most significant paper [9] studied accurately the effects of
a voltage glitch on the DFFs of a CMOS circuit. It showed,
on a simulation basis, that power supply glitches cannot
induce faults into DFFs. It also confirmed, according electrical
simulations, that the faults injected by negative voltage glitches
are due to timing constraint violations. The latter are caused
by an increase of the combinatorial logic propagation delays.
Other explanations of the fault injection mechanism related
to power glitches may be found. The authors of [19] stated
that due to voltage glitches ”different sub-circuits might be
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Fig. 4. AES-128 general outline.
powered at different voltages, hence, enabling fault injec-
tions”. However, they did not provide any evidence of this
phenomenon.
At the time being, no experimental proof of the assumption
that power glitch induced faults are injected by timing con-
straint violations has been provided. The main intent of this
paper is to provide such an experimental proof.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SET-UP
A. AES test chip, board and voltage pulse generators
AES is a standard established by the NIST [15] for sym-
metric key cryptography. It is a substitution and permuta-
tion network, based on four transformations (i.e. SubBytes,
ShiftRows, MixColumns, AddRoundKey), used iteratively in
rounds as depicted in fig. 4. The test chip (Xilinx Spartan 3A
FPGA) embeds a hardware 128-bit version of this algorithm
(AES-128). It processes data blocks of 128 bits (usually
represented as a 4x4 bytes matrix, called the AES state),
in ten rounds (after round 0).The round keys (K1 to K10)
used during every round are calculated on-the-fly, by a key
expansion module. In fig. 4, the 4x4 bytes matrices also point
out where the registers storing the AES’ state are located in our
design: just before the SubBytes transformation. The design is
shaped in a loop encompassing the four AES transformations
and the registers bank used to store the AES’ state. Hence, a
full encryption is completed in eleven clock periods. The test
chip nominal clock period is 100 MHz. In this work, AES is
mainly used as a test element. Thus, we will not go deeper
into its properties. However, because this algorithm is likely
to be subject to DFA, the obtained results are still of interest.
The component is mounted on a board with voltage reg-
ulators that provide the voltage supplies of its I/O ports
and of its internal core logic : 3.3V and 1.2V respectively.
Communication interfaces with this device are also provided.
Many capacitances are connected between the board’s ground
and the supply rails of the chip. We have opened the supply
rail of the FPGA’s voltage core to make it possible to inject
a voltage glitch into its logic. We have also de-soldered the
capacitance of the voltage core supply rail to improve the
efficiency of the fault injection process. An SMA connector
has been soldered in place of a capacitance which was close
to the core voltage input of the FPGA, in order to diminish
the reflection phenomena that will affect the injected voltage
pulse.
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For the purpose of injecting power supply glitches we used
two pulse generators (Agilent 814A and Picosecond 10,300B).
B. Outline of experiments
1) Methods: For a given set of data (plaintext and key)
processed by the AES test chip, we used both clock and power
supply glitches to gather and study the injected faults. For
the sake of simplicity, we focused on the first injected fault
obtained for every round of the AES, while increasing the stress
applied to the FPGA (i.e. a step by step decrease of the faulted
period duration or increase of the amplitude of the negative
voltage glitch).
The clock glitch generator allowed to target independently
the ten rounds of the AES. We did not succeed in inducing fault
during the AES initial round because it has a very short data
propagation time. Any clock glitch short enough to violate the
corresponding critical time also faults the controlling FSM of
the device driving it into a non-recovering fail state. While
the data propagation times of the subsequent ten rounds are
the longest of the design, we were always able to induce
faults in these rounds by means of clock glitches. Besides,
the first injected fault reveals the corresponding critical time
(as detailed in [14]). Then, for each data-set, we gathered
the injected faults while targeting each AES round (except
the initial one) and their critical times. Figure 5 reports the
critical times obtained for a given data-set at nominal supply
voltage (1.2V). They are obviously shorter than the clock
period (10ns). As expected, the paths measured for each round
were found different (because the data processed during each
round were also different).
The utilized pulse generators are able to provide a DC
voltage in addition to pulses. We used this feature to power
the test chip internal core. Moreover, it allowed us to carry
out underpowering attacks as illustrated in fig. 6. As the
core voltage is decreased, the critical times of each round
are increased (the grey shaded parts in fig. 6). A measure of
these critical times was made by using simultaneously clock
glitches. In the instance of fig. 6, the critical time of the 9th
round goes beyond the clock period. Then, a fault is injected.
Our main intent was to compare faults induced by power
supply glitches with those induced by clock glitches. To do so,
we used negative power supply glitches as depicted in figures
7 and 8.
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2) Library of clock glitch induced faults: A data-set library
of 1,000 random {Plaintext, Key} couples was built. For each
couple a first fault-free encryption was run, and the obtained
correct ciphetext was added to the library. Then, for each
AES round of each encryption, a fault injection experiment by
means of clock glitches was carried out. The corresponding
clock faulted period was reduced progressively by steps of
35ps until a first fault was induced. Next, the faulted ciphertext
was processed by reversing the AES encryption (the key and
plaintext being known), in order to find out the injected fault
and to check its instant of appearance. It allowed us to study
the fault nature (i.e. the number of faulted bits and their
location). Finally, the injected faults were added to the library.
3) Library of power supply glitch induced faults: The same
data-set library of 1,000 random {Plaintext, Key} couples
was used to conduct fault injection experiments by means of
power supply glitches. These experiments were carried out in
a similar way: a progressive increase of the applied stress until
a first fault appears. The injection time was varied according
to the principle illustrated in fig. 7 and 8, in order to target all
the AES rounds. Finally, the injected faults were added to the
library.
4) Experimental proof: Then, clock and power glitches
induced faults were compared in order to check whether they
were identical or not. If identical, it would be an experimental
proof that faults induced by clock and power glitches are due
to timing constraint violations, i.e. that they originate in the
same injection mechanism. The experimental results we have
obtained are reported in the next section.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Clock glitch results
We observed, as expected, that this injection process is
data-dependent and also that the metastability phenomenon
exemplified in fig. 2-b is observable. Faults were injected
successfully at each round of the AES. The obtained faults
were single-bit with a rate slightly greater than 90%.
B. Power supply glitch results
1) Experimental issues: The settings and methods reported
in this work were found experimentally after many trials and
errors. We finally found out that we need to inject a pulse in
the 20ns range similar to those depicted in figs. 7 and 8 at a
negative amplitude beyond 30V to go through the internal low
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time
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filtering effect originated in the core voltage supply port: the
pulse amplitude inside the component was highly attenuated.
However, we were still unable to match the timing accuracy we
had with clock glitches. After reversing the encryption of the
faulty ciphertexts, we found that faults were often injected in
two or three subsequent rounds. We drew the hypothesis that
the injected pulse was distorted and its effect was extended
over a larger period of time as illustrated on figure 9.
The remedy to this lack of accuracy was to use the second
pulse generator (Picosecond 10,300B) to boost the rising part
of the actually injected glitch as shown in figure 10 (As a
result, the core power supply is also increased during the
following rounds. However, it had no adverse effect on the
computations of the IC). The correcting pulse was positive,
with a 20V amplitude and a 100ns duration. Fig. 11 and 12
display the core supply rail voltage captured by an oscilloscope
during pulsed injection performed with both techniques. Many
oscillations appear. We also drew a low-filtered view of
the voltage to figure how it may be inside the component
(after passing through the supply port). This confirms the
assumptions of fig. 9 and 10.
However, because critical times are data-dependent, a dif-
ferent setting of the faulting pulse’s amplitude was to be found
for each round of each data-set. Consequently, a different
setting of the correcting pulse was needed. This led to very
long tuning steps. Thus, we simultaneously used a constant
modification of the power supply and a voltage glitch to ease
the process. The glitches settings were kept constant (for both
faulting and correcting pulses). The core power supply value
and the timing parameters were the only varying parameters
of our experiments. This technique is illustrated in fig. 13
where the low grey shaded squares represent the critical time
increase due to underpowering and the deep grey shaded
squares represent the critical time increase due to the voltage
pulse. In this instance, round 6 was faulted.
2) Results: Due to the long time needed to carry out power
glitch experiments, we report here the injection results from
140 different rounds. The single-bit fault injection success rate
was also slightly greater than 90%. As expected, the data-
dependent nature of the injection process and also the metasta-
bility phenomenon, exemplified in fig. 2-b, were observed. The
experimental results are :
• 70% of the injected faults were identical to those obtained
by using clock glitch injection,
• 10% of the injected faults were induced by violating the
timing constraints of the second most critical path of the
round (as further clock glitches experiments revealed),
• 20% of the injected faults were injected in neighbouring
rounds of the targeted one.
The latter behaviour is exemplified in figure 14: a round with
a critical path shorter than those of its neighbouring rounds
may be unreachable.
C. Results analysis
For both studied fault injection means (clock and power
glitches), we have observed the two main distinguishing
features of timing constraint violations: data-dependency and
the occurrence of a metastability phenomenon. Moreover,
70% of the injected faults were found to be identical. The
remaining 10% and 20% were explained respectively by the
violation of the 2nd or 3rd most critical path and by fault
injection in neighbouring rounds. We believe that this is an
effective experimental proof of the uniqueness of the injection
mechanism. Even if the power glitch injection setup is far less
accurate than the clock glitches one in some specific cases it
could be easier to inject fault on the power supply line than
on the clock line.
We did not report in this paper our experiments of fault
injection with positive power supply glitches. The reason is
that we were unable to induce faults on our FPGA board set-
up by using our pulse generators, despite their wide range of
available settings in amplitude and time. Further experiments
have to be carried out before being able to draw a conclusion.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have provided an experimental proof of
the equivalence of the fault injection mechanism by means of
clock and power supply glitches. The proof lies in the nature
of the injected faults: they were the same or very similar for
a given data-set irrespectively of the injection means used.
Besides, we have conducted an in-depth study of the properties
of these faults. It has revealed the ability to induce single-bit
faults with a success rate beyond 90%. Power supply glitches
also make it possible to fault almost every encryption round of
our test chip (near 80% success rate). As, 10% of the injected
faults were induced by violation of the 2nd or 3rd most critical
path of the targeted ound, it suggests that there may also be a
spatial effect associated with power glitches. This assumption
would be studying in further researsh work.
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